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CASE COMMENTS
under the peculiar fact situation of each new case whether a particular
spectator's claim is foreseeable or not.
31
Underlying the Dillon decision there appears to be an additional
factor contributing to the finding for the plaintiff. It should be obvious
that Mrs. Dillon would not have been permitted to recover if her
daughter had not been killed or otherwise seriously injured. Since
the cause of the harm to the plaintiff was from shock at the appre-
hension of an injury to another, it would not be reasonable to permit
a plaintiff to recover if the injury threatened or incurred by the victim
was only slight or superficial. Indeed, there is authority advancing
this argument as a basis for denying recovery. 32 Therefore, to the
three criteria advanced in Dillon this fourth one should be added
when considering future cases.3
3
JAMES JULIUS WINN, JR.
EFFECT OF LEASE TERM UPON RATE OF DEPRECIATION
IN TRADE FIXTURE CONDEMNATION AWARDS
When the government seeks to condemn rented commercial real
estate, the necessary eminent domain proceedings present very complex
legal and evaluation problems.' Disputes frequently arise as to the
nature and amount of compensation due a business tenant for his
-1We are not now called upon to decide whether, in the absence or reduced
weight of some of the above factors [set out in note 29 supra], we would
conclude that the accident and injury were not reasonably foreseeable
and that therefore defendant owed no duty of due care to plaintiff. In
future cases the courts will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more
subtle than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint before us.
Id. at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
-Edwards v. Miranne, 11 So. 2d 271 (La. Ct. App. 1942) (recovery denied to
husband suing for mental distress where injury to his wife was slight); see William-
son v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (196o); IV. PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (3d ed.
1964).
uProsser suggests that the serious injury to the victim need be only threatened,
but case authority seems to indicate that the injury must have in fact occurred.
Compare W. PROSSER, TORTS § 55 at 354 (3 d ed. 1964) with Edwards v. Miranne, it
So. 2d 271, 272 (La. Ct. App. 1942).
'See generally Horgan, Some Legal and Appraisal Considerations in Leasehold
Valuation fUnder Eminent Domain, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 34 (1963); Kizer, Valuation of
Leasehold Estates in Eminent Domain, 67 W. VA. L. REV. io1 (1965); Polasky, The
Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REv. 477 (1962).
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trade fixtures.2 In general, a trade fixture is a chattel annexed to
realty by a lessee to further the trade or commercial purposes for
which the premises were rented.3 Since the removal of trade fixtures
often result in their destruction, severe damage or substantial loss
of market value, such losses are usually compensable. 4 Where trade
fixtures have an economic life extending beyond the term of a lease-
hold, a serious question is raised as to the proper depreciation rate to
be used in computing compensation for condemnation. See Figure i,
page 79-
Recently in United States v. Certain Property, Borough of Man-
hattan, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established a
new rule for valuation of removable trade fixtures on leased premises
subject to condemnation proceedings. The Government sought to
take a certain parcel of land for use as a United States Post Office
site. Situated on the land were several buildings with thirteen busi-
ness concerns as tenants, all on short-term leases without renewal
options. Seven leaseholds had expired prior to the taking, four ex-
pired within six months thereafter and two expired nineteen months
after the taking. Condemnation commissioners awarded compensa-
tion for trade fixtures to the several tenants on the following basis:
-See generally Sackman, Fixtures in Condemnation, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 6TH
ANN. INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1964); Note, Compensation for a Lessee's Trade
Fixtures in Condemnation Proceedings, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 1215.
3Trade fixtures are a special class of fixtures generally removable by a tenant
at any time during his lease since they have not been sufficiently annexed or attach-
ed to have become merged in the realty through the doctrine of accession. State
Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.-d 707 (1955). In
New York the test is removability without material damage to the freehold and
severe damage of the article itself or loss of substantially all of its value on
severance. United States v. Certain Property, Etc., 3o6 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962);
Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963). In New
Jersey a trade fixture is any chattel annexed for a trade purpose. Handler v.
Horns, 2 N.J. 18, 65 A.2d 523 (1949). See BLAcK'S LAW DiTIONARY 766 (4th ed.
1951).
'See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States
v. Certain Property, Etc., S44 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain
Property, Etc., 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d
299 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942);
Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963); In re
Whitlock Ave., 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281 (1938); In re Allen St. & First Ave.,
256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 1o6 N.E. 758
(1914); In re Seward Park Slum Clearance Project, io App. Div. 2d 498, 2oo N.Y.S.2d
802 (196o).
5388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968). Other recent Second Circuit eminent domain
cases of confusing similarity in style are cited in footnotes to this comment. When
any of these cases are encountered, confusion can be minimized by a comparison
of full citations.
TRADE FIXTURE DEPRECIATION METHODS
in United States v. Certain Property,
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Compensation equals (Replacement Cost6 less Accrued Straight
Line Depreciation 7 over Useful Life8) minus (Resale Value after
Removal) plus (Disassembly and Reassembly Costs) 9
The district court confirmed these awards.'0 The Government ap-
pealed asserting that, in the case of short-term leases without renewal
options, it is unreasonable for a lessee to expect to derive benefit
from his fixtures beyond the term of his lease since he has no legal
assurance of remaining on the premises;" and therefore, the com-
pensation for trade fixtures should be calculated using a depreciation
rate determined by the length of the current lease. A majority of a
three judge panel agreed with the Government's contentions and held
that, as a matter of law for trade fixture compensation, a reason-
able depreciation rate is that fixed by the length of the lease when
the tenant is unable to show an enforceable right to remain longer.'
2
See Curve B, Figure I, page 79. The minority judge noted that more
than half of these very tenants were at the time of the taking hold-
GIn eminent domain cases replacement cost generally is used interchangeably
with reproduction cost and is synonymous with current cost or value of similar
property on the open market.
FStraight line depreciation is the simplest and most widely used form of
depreciation. Total loss in value is spread uniformly over the entire period of
depreciation. E. GRANT & W. IRESON, PRINCIPLES OF ENGINEERING EcONOIY i68 (4th
ed. 196o); H. GUTHMAN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 488 (3d ed.
1955); P. SAmUELSON, ECONOMICS 101 (4th ed. 1958); G. SMrrH, ENGINEERING ECONOMY
2o (1968).
81n eminent domain cases useful life is used interchangeably with service life
to mean the period of time within which an item has value as determined by
considerations of deterioration from age and use and of functional obsolesence.
9In the words of the court:
The commissioners arrived at compensation allowances by starting with
the "new value" of the fixtures; from that valuation depreciation on a
twenty year straight line basis was first deducted and then, from that
remainder, there was deducted "what a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller" for the fixtures after their removal "and after allowing for the cost
of disassembly and reassembly."
388 F.2d at 598.
"These awards were confirmed in an unreported memorandum opinion of
July 1, 1965 of the same court involving the same case as United States v. Certain
Property in Borough of Manhattan, 225 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The un-
reported memorandum opinion adopted the recommendations of condemnation
commissioners appointed to implement the findings in the earlier reported and
cited opinion.
"The Government also appealed on the issue of whether it should be required
to compensate for fixtures that were excepted in the declaration of taking. The
court held: "The Government cannot deny compensation for fixtures by simply
writing an exception into the declaration of taking excluding from compensation
property which is in fact taken." 388 F.2d at 598, citing as authority United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 ('945).
"388 F.2d at 598-99.
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over tenants continuing to derive benefits from their trade fixtures
beyond the expiration of their leases.
The tenants then petitioned the court of appeals for a rehearing
en banc. The court rejected the holding of the panel and ruled that
depreciation should be computed from the useful life of trade fixtures
without consideration of lease length. It reasoned that "[r]esort to
depreciated cost in the evaluation of tenants' fixture claims is simply
a means to an end;"' 3 namely, just compensation, which it had viewed
in earlier trade fixture cases as "what a purchaser would pay for [fix-
tures] for use in the premises being condemned."'14 It found that this
purchase price would be no "more than the current cost of comparable
new fixtures less an appropriate allowance for deterioration from use
and obsolescence."' 5 The court concluded that such an allowance is
the same as depreciation at a rate determined by useful life and, as
such, is unrelated to lease length. See Curve A, Figure I, page 79.
Findings in a related case' 6 involving the fee owners of the same
realty raised the possibility that even if condemnation proceedings had
not ensued, these particular lessees might have been forced to vacate
their premises because of alleged plans by the landlords to raze some or
all of the buildings. Taking notice of that case, the court recognized
that in such a situation "because of a factor altogether independent of
the condemnation, the tenant could not reasonably expect either to
continue in possession throughout the useful life of the fixtures or to
sell them at an earlier date to the landlord or a successor for use in
situ.'u1 To prevent a windfall of excessive compensation, an alter-
native schedule of depreciation accelerated from useful life to the
time of an independent cause was provided. See Curve C, Figure I,
page 79. The opinion makes it clear, however, that to justify com-
pensation under an accelerated depreciation rate the condemnor
must successfully sustain the burden of showing both the existence
of some cause completely independent of condemnation and that
this independent cause would reasonably reduce the tenant's ability
to benefit from the entire useful life of his fixture. But the court em-
phasizes that the mere fact that there is a short-term lease without
a renewal option or that there is an occupancy in hold-over status
"Id. at 6oo.
"United States v. Certain Property, Etc. 3o6 F.2d 439, 448 (2d Cir. 1962).
'5388 F.2d at 6oo.
'OUnited States v. Certain Property, Borough of Manhattan, 374 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1967).
17388 F.2d at 602.
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alone, without other objective evidence of reasonable knowledge by
the lessee that he could expect no further benefits from his trade fix-
tures beyond the current lease term, is not sufficient to warrant use of
an accelerated depreciation rate.' s
The right of a business tenant to receive compensation for the loss
of his trade fixtures in a public taking of his leasehold interest has
long been recognized in American law.' 9 It generally has been held
that, while a tenant may not recover for mere personalty unattached to
the realty,20 he is entitled to compensation for the destruction, damage,
and depreciation of his fixtures as caused by the taking of his lease-
hold.21 The fact that a lessee is free to remove his fixtures at any time
during the term,2 2 absent agreement to the contrary or absent sub-
stantial injury to the premises, 23 does not deny his right to compen-
sation when they are in fact taken or moved under an impending
taking. A right to trade fixture compensation is also recognized even
where the tenancy is at will2 4 or in mere hold-over status.25 Although
a condemnation clause in the lease acts to cut off a tenant's claim for
loss of the unexpired portion of his leasehold, it is ineffective as to
"'Two judges dissented with one pointing out the possibility of another form
of windfall. He argued that absent condemnation a lessee unwilling or, in fact,
unable to extend his occupancy by lease renewal or holding-over, would rarely
obtain from a purchaser a sales price reflecting a depreciation rate over the use-
ful life of a fixture. 388 F.2d at 602. The other dissent indicated that the lease
term cannot be disregarded since it is "quite clear that fixtures owned by a tenant
under a lease with twenty years to run are worth more than fixtures belonging
to a tenant who -has no lease." Id. at 6o3.
"'In re Water Front, 192 N.Y. 295, 84 N.E. 11o5 (19o8); In re Appointment of
Park Comm'rs, 17 N.Y.S.R. 371, 1 N.Y.S. 763 (Super. Ct. 1888).
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923); Foster v. United
States, 145 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1944); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Second Street Improvement
Co., 256 Mo. 386, 166 S.W. 296 (1914); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d
6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963); In re Whitlock Ave., 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281 (1938).2'United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v.
Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land,
Etc., o02 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d
6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
2'United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948); United States
v. Block, 16o F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Seagren, 5o F.2d 333 (D.C.
Cir. 1931); People v. Ganahl Lumber Co., io Cal. 3d 501, 75 P.2d 1o67 (1938);
In re Allen St. & First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931)-
OCorrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893); In re Allen St.
& First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); In re Seward Park Slum Clearance
Project, 1o App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 8o02 (196o).
2In re Gratiot Ave., 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755 (194o); In re Seward Park
Slum Clearance Project, so App. Div. 2d 498, 20oo N.Y.S.2d 802 (196o).
'Finney v. City of St. Louis, 39 Mo. 177 (1866).
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trade fixtures.20 Thus, a tenant "retains the right to compensation for
his interest in any annexations to the real property which, but for
[condemnation], he would have had the right to remove at the end of
his lease."
27
The traditional and most widely used method for valuation of
condemned real estate with trade fixtures is the so called "unit rule.
'28
The rule requires a determination of the market value of the premises
as a whole, inclusive of all fixtures and improvements. 29 Each tenant
who owns trade fixtures is then entitled to share with the landlord
in the total award by an amount equal to that contributed to the
overall market value of his fixtures.30 Under this rule the value of
fixtures and of the unexpired term of the leasehold are not viewed
separately but are merged by following the "undivided fee" 31 concept,
2'United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Roffman v. Wilming-
ton Housing Authority, 179 A.2d 99 (Del. 1962); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285,
189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 1o5 (1963); In re Allen St. & First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236
176 N.E. 377 (1931); Gristede Bros. v. State, ii App. Div. 2d 580, 2oo N.Y.S.2d
755 (196o).
2In re Allen St. SL First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236, 243, 176 N.E. 377, 379 (1931).
A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Meadows v. United
States, 144 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1944); United States v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473
(8th Cir. 1942); United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931); City of
Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 262 P. 737 (1928); El Monte School Dist.
v. Wilkins, 177 Cal. App. 2d 47, 1 Cal. Rptr. 715 (Dist. Ct. App. 196o); In re
Allen St. & First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 977 (g3i); Stanpark Realty Corp.
v. City of Norfolk, 199 Va. 716, lo S.E.2d 527 (1958).
2"United States v. Becktold Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942); Pause v. City of
Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896); Brackett v. Commonwealth, 223 Mass. iig,
iii N.E. 1036 (1916); Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582
(Ct. CI. 1958). See also -Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239
N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963) (rejecting the "unit rule" as to trade fixtures of a lessee
but describing its operation).
10See generally Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d
1o5 (1963) which rejects the "unit rule" as to trade fixtures of a lessee but de-
scribes its operation.
3iThe "undivided fee" concept is used in evaluation of condemned land sub-
ject to claims of multiple ownership. The realty is appraised as if in single
ownership to establish an absolute maximum award for the parcel. This award
is then apportioned among the several claimants in accord with their proportionate
interests. See Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 16o F.2d 182 (5 th Cir.
1947); Mayor v. United States, 147 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1945); Lambert v. Griffin,
257 Ill. 152, ioo N.E. 496 (1912); Commercial Delivery Serv. v. Medema, 7 Ill. App.
2d 419, 129 N.E.2d 579 (1955); New Jersey Highway Authority v. J. & F. Holding
Co., 4o N.J. Super. 3o9, 12 A.2d 25 (Super. Ct. 1956); In re Allen St. &- First Ave.,
256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Pomeroy v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 377, 191 N.Y.S.2d
84 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951);
Moulton v. George, 20o8 Tenn. 586, 348 S.W.2d 12!9 (961); Stanpark Realty Corp.
v. City of Norfolk, 199 Va. 716, 101 S.E.2d 527 (1958). Only in rare cases where
the sum of the values of the separate interests exceeded the unencumbered fee
value have the courts allowed separate valuation and compensation. Mayor of Balti-
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used in valuing estates of more than one person in land itself.
Typically, in an eminent domain proceeding governed by the
"unit rule," the entire premises including all fixtures are appraised
and a market value is estimated without regard to lease arrangements
or ownership of fixtures.3 2 The amount so derived is the total condem-
nation award.33 Next occurs computation of the market value of a
particular tenant's leasehold as enhanced by the presence of his trade
fixtures.3 4 The ratio of the latter market value to the former de-
termines the particular tenant's prorated share of the condemnation
award.
35
Since World War II there has been evidence of judicial doubt
as to the adequacy of the "unit rule" to cover all situations and of
the growth of a judicial feeling that its universal use may lead to
inequities.36 Where fixtures are custom built or are of unique design
or configuration, it may be almost impossible to show their market
value much less their contribution to the market value of the premises
as a whole. In 1945 the United States Supreme Court, commenting
upon the use of market value in a trade fixture compensation case,
more v. Latrobe, ioi Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (19o5). See also City of St. Louis v. Rassi,
333 Mo. 1092, 64 S.W.2d 6oo (1933). In rented real estate the landlord receives
compensation for his reversionary interest in the fee. E.g., United States v. Delaware,
L. & W. R.R., 264 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1959); In re Gratiot Ave., 294 Mich. 569, 293
N.W. 755 (194o); In re Delancey St., 12o App. Div. 700, 1O5 N.Y.S. 779 (1907). The
tenant is compensated for the loss of his leasehold. E.g., A. W. Duckett & Co. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731,
262 P. 737 (1927); In re Triborough Bridge Approach, 159 Misc. 617, 288 N.Y.S.
697 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
"See Kinter v. United States, 156 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 149 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1945); United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333
(D.C. Cir. 1931); City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933);
Pause v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896); Harmsen v. Iowa State High-
way Comm'n, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.V.2d 66o (196o); In re Allen St. & First Ave.,
256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, io6 N.E. 758
(1914); Tinnerholm v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 311, 179 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1953);
State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194 (1936); Stanpark Realty Corp. v.
City of Norfolk, 199 Va. 716, 1O1 S.E.2d 527 (1958). See generally Marraro v. State,
12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d io5 (1963) (rejecting the "unit rule"
as to trade fixtures of a lessee but describing its operation); Sowers v. Shaeffer, 155
Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
33Cases cited note 32 supra.
"Cases cited note 32 supra.
85Cases cited note 32 supra.
3OUnited States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v.
Certain Property, Etc., 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Prop-
erty, Etc., 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d
526 (2d Cir. 1948); Marraro v, State, i N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d
io5 (1963).
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recognized this problem in United States v. General Motors Corp.:37
"In some cases this criterion cannot be used either because the in-
terest condemned has no market value or because, in the circum-
stances, market value furnishes an inappropriate measure of actual
value." 33 In General Motors the condemnee received compensation
for his trade fixtures and, in addition, compensation for the value of
the loss of his right of occupancy under the lease. Thus, the "unit
rule" idea of compensation for the leasehold value, enhanced by the
value of the lessee's fixtures, was clearly disregarded.
39
Marraro v. State,40 a 1963 New York case, specifically rejected the
"unit rule" for use in trade fixture cases involving rented premises
except in those instances where the fixtures are an integral part of or
are functionally necessary to the operation of the condemned realty.
The primary reason for this rejection was the almost hopelessly compli-
cated task of evaluating the enhancement of the overall value of a large
multi-tenant facility by any single tenant's fixtures. In the words of
the court, "'It would impose an intolerable burden upon a small store
or shop owner to prove how much his shop enhanced the value of a
very large and expensive building'." 41 Since New York is considered
to be the jurisdiction with the greatest experience in eminent domain
and to have the most highly developed law of condemnation,42 it is
probable that other states will likewise abandon the "unit rule" in
compensating for trade fixtures on leased land they condemn.
In the instances where unit valuation has been adjudged inappro-
priate, New York and some federal courts have adopted an alternative
approach known as separate valuation.4 3 Separate valuation is simply
'323 U.S. 373 (1945)-
"Id. at 379.
"Several years later Judge Learned Hand specifically questioned whether the
unit rule has universal application by stating "[I]t is an undue simplification to
extract from the books any 'Unit Rule' whatever, in the sense of general authorita-
tive directions .... [A]s different situations have arisen, the courts have dealt with
them as the specific fact demanded." United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d
526, 528 (2d Cir. 1948).
1012 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
"1Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 292, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 61o, 239 N.Y.S.2d 1o5,
1o9 (1963) (quoting opinion of lower court).
"Sackman, Fixtures in Condemnation, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 6TH ANN. INST.
on EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 2 (1964).
'1 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v.
Certain Property, Borough of Manhattan, 388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Certain Property, Etc., 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain
Property, Etc., 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. City of New York,
165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Block, i6o, F.2d 604 (gth Cir. 1947);
Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
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a determination of the sound value of a trade fixture "as used equip-
ment in place." 44 The valuation and its consequent award is for a
particular lessee's trade fixtures alone; it is made in addition to any
compensation for the leasehold interest itself and is completely un-
connected to the value of other tenants' fixtures and leasehold in-
terests.4 5 The reasoning in cases using separate valuation is that "the
appropriate measure of the value of... fixtures is what a purchaser
would pay for them for use in the premises being condemned" 46 and
that this, in turn, can be computed by deducting a reasonable de-
preciation from the replacement cost.47 This yields the sound value
or present worth at the time of condemnation. Specifically, separate
valuation cases hold that:
The courts should not be concerned that valuation on this
basis may produce a figure larger than what might be paid for
the building, with all the fixtures in place, by a single pur-
chaser who might not be interested in many of them; each
owner, landlord or tenant, is entitled to the value of what the
Government took from him.48
By focusing on the loss to the individual tenant, the separate valua-
tion approach more closely meets the Supreme Court's concept of
just compensation than does the "unit rule:"
Such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in
money of the property taken. The owner is to be put in as
good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken.4 9
The critical portion of the separate valuation is the rate of de-
preciation, which is determined by the period of time over which de-
preciation occurs. Compare Curves A and B, Figure I, page 79. The
length of the depreciation period was the central issue of United States
v. Certain Property, Borough of Manhattan. Until the principal case
no court seems to have addressed itself to the question of what con-
stitutes a reasonable depreciation rate in terms of lease length for
trade fixture compensation. Since the "unit rule" focuses upon trade
"United States v. Certain Property, Etc., 3o6 F.2d 439, 453 (2d Cir. 1962).
'5Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
'0United States v. Certain Property, Etc., 3o6 F.2d 439, 448 (2d Cir. 1962).
7United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v.
Certain Property, Etc., 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Property,
Etc., 3o6 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526
(2d Cir. 1948); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 6o6, 239 N.Y.S.2d 1o5
(1963).
"United States v. Certain Property, Etc., 3o6 F.2d 439, 453 (2d Cir. 1962).
"'United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
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fixture enhancement of the value of estates in land rather than on the
value of a fixture itself, depreciation is of little or no importance; con-
sequently, courts deciding cases under the "unit rule" have given
questions of depreciation little consideration.
The separate valuation cases of the past appear to have approved
depreciation accrued over useful life5O without considering the rele-
vancy of the lease length. That this was the effect actually achieved by
these courts can hardly be doubted since they employed depreciation
based upon age, wear out periods, and obsolescence51-the determi-
nants of useful life. One justification for this is that useful life is an
objective standard,52 while a depreciation rate fixed by lease length
involves speculation as to the tenant's detriment at the hands of the
condemnor5
3
United States v. Certain Property, Borough of Manhattan, held
that the proper rate of depreciation for trade fixture compensation
is that fixed by useful life without regard to the length of any lease.
But the court recognized the possibility that a "factor altogether inde-
pendent of the condemnation"' 4 might have intervened in the absence
of condemnation and that this independent cause could have prevented
the tenant from receiving benefit of the full useful life of his trade
fixture. The court said that in such instances an alternative schedule
of depreciation based on the time of the independent cause should be
used to prevent a windfall to the tenant who would not otherwise
have realized benefit of that useful life. However, the court made it
clear that to justify the lessened compensation under such an accelerat-
rwSee United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States
v. Certain Property, Etc., 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain
Property, Etc., 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. City of New York,
165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239
N.Y.S.2d 1o5 (1963). See also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 528 (4 th ed. 1951).
MSee cases cited note 50 supra.
rarhe most widely accepted concept of depreciation is "loss ... in value, arising
from age, use, and improvements, due to better methods." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY
528 (4th ed. 1951). Sometimes referred to as an "impaired serviceableness" doctrine,
a reasonable depreciation rate allows for the deterioration and obsolescence to
which all objects, including trade fixtures, are subject: namely, physical wear
and tear as well as becoming outmoded technically. The useful life of any
object, piece of equipment, or structure is simply an expert's estimate, based upon
the aforementioned considerations, of the period of time within which full deprecia-
tion will occur. E. GRANT & W. IRSON, PRINCIPLES OF ENGINEERING ECONOMY 188
(4 th ed. 196o). It follows logically that under an "impaired serviceableness" doctrine
lease length is totally unrelated and of no possible effect.
r'388 F.2d at 6oi; In re Allen St. & First Ave., 256 N.Y. 236, 249, 176 N.E.
377, 381 (1931).
r388 F.2d at 602.
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ed depreciation rate, the condemnor would have to bear the burdens
of showing the existence of such an independent cause and that the
independent cause would reasonably reduce the tenant's ability to
benefit from the entire useful life of his fixture.
The court did not define what it meant by the term "independent
cause," although, in light of the facts of the related case, 5 a land-
lord's plan to raze the building would clearly be such a cause. That
length of lease could be such cause only in rare situations was made
dear by the court when it emphasized that the mere fact that there
is only a short-term lease without a renewal option or that there is
only a hold-over occupancy does not establish an "independent cause"
for purposes of accelerating depreciation. Other objective evidence of
reasonable knowledge by the tenant that he could expect no further
benefits from his trade fixtures beyond the current lease term would
be required. The fact that the landlord has contracted to rent to
another tenant when the condemnee's lease runs out might well meet
the other objective evidence requirement.56 But even here, if the suc-
cessor tenant were in the same business as the condemnee tenant, the
possibility that the condemnee could sell his trade fixtures to the
successor might preclude acceleration of the depreciation since the
burden is on the condemnor to prove that the independent cause will
reduce the condemnee's ability to benefit from the entire useful life.
WILLIAM A. VAUGHAN
EXPLANATION OF FIGURE I
Figure I is a graphical representation of the several depreciation
methods for trade fixtures in United States v. Certain Property,
Borough of Manhattan, 388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. i968). The vertical
scale shows the basic formula: Compensation equals Replacement Cost
minus Depreciation. The horizontal scale presents the particular
points in time that determine the rate of "straight line depreciation."
With the same replacement cost depreciated over different periods
of time the effect upon depreciation and compensation caused by
altering the time is readily seen. Since the time of condemnation is
uUnited States v. Certain Property, Borough of Manhattan, 374 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1967).
r-Other objective evidence that a lessee could not expect reasonably to receive
benefits from his trade fixtures beyond his current lease might be: premises to be
sold to new landlord for his exclusive use, uses to change to something inconsistent
with tenant's use, sale or relinquishing of option to renew lease, landlord informed
tenant to move at end of term, tenant notified lease not renewable or tenancy at
will or hold-over to cease, eviction proceedings begun, agreement or understanding
that tenant will remove fixtures at end of current lease.
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the point at which compensation is computed, it is the reference
point for determining the depreciation. By reading down the con-
demnation line to the point of intersection with the desired deprecia-
tion rate, one merely reads along the horizontal projection of the
point of intersection to the vertical cost scale to arrive at depreciation
and its associated compensation.
CHANGE OF VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES:
MANDAMUS TO REVIEW A PRETRIAL ORDER
In order to obtain a fair and impartial trial in criminal proceed-
ings, change of venue procedures are provided by statutes in most
states.1 Should all pretrial motions for change of venue be overruled,
the defendant's traditional remedy has been that of attempting to
show after his conviction that the trial judge abused his discretion
in denying the motion for change of venue.2 Most jurisdictions do
not allow pretrial appellate review of the motion for change of venue
as it is considered an interlocutory appeal and, therefore, properly
appealable only after final judgment.3 California had previously ad-
hered to this view4 but in spite of that fact, the Supreme Court of
'E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § io3 (West 1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1801 (1948);
N.Y. CODE CR11. PROC. § s44 (McKinney 1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-224 (RepI.
Vol. 196o); See also FED. R. CIA. P. 21(a). These statutes, which are typical, provide
that the defendant may apply for a change of venue after indictment. Additionally,
many statutes provide for renewal of the motion after the voir dire examination.
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1033.5 (West 1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1318 (1964);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 51 (Rev. Ed. 1968); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-1719
(1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-01 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 131.400 (1967); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 551 (1964). Maine has deleted criminal cases from its venue
statute. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §508 (Supp. 1968).
2For cases finding an abuse of discretion, see People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d
792, 236 P.2d 145 (1961); Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla. 124, 79 So. 731 (1918); People
v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, o4 N.E. 8o4 (1914); Williams v. Commonwealth, 287
Ky. 570, 154 S.W.2d 563 (1941); Smith v. State, 2 Md. App. 72, 233 A.2d 371 (1967).
For cases where no abuse of discretion was found, see People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.
2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965); Nowels v. People, .... Colo.
442 P.2d 410 (1968); State v. Poulos, 196 Kan. 253, 411 P.2d 694, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 827 (1966); State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 417 (1966); Swain
v. State, 2i9 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d 452 (1966).
nHoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963); Stokes
v. State, go Idaho 339, 411 P.2d 392 (1966); State v. Bihain, 251 Iowa 439, 1o
N.W.2d 29 (196o); Hamilton v. Smart, 78 Kan. 218, 95 P. 836 (1908); Pankey v.
Pound, 428 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1968); Commonwealth v. Sites, 430 Pa. 115, 242 A.2d
22o (ig68). Contra, State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963).
'Miles v. Justice's Court, 13 Cal. App. 454, 110 P. 349 (Dist. Ct. App. 1910).
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California recently held in Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino
County that mandamus lies to review a pretrial order denying change
of venue.5
In Maine, the petitioner faced indictments for murder, rape,
kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit murder. The trial
judge overruled the petitioner's motion for change of venue but
with leave to renew the motion after the voir dire examination of
the prospective jurors. Before the voir dire examination, the petitioner
requested that the Supreme Court of California review the ruling
of the trial court, and issue a writ of mandamus directing that venue
be changed. The prosecution argued that the petitioner's other
remedies at law were adequate since the defense could exercise its
peremptory challenges on the voir dire, could renew the motion for
change of venue after the voir dire examination, and could appeal
the trial court's ruling after the trial. The supreme court rejected
the arguments and found these remedies at law to be inadequate. It
said that the right to exercise peremptory challenges does not neces-
sarily insure that jurors are impartial; that the right to renew the
motion after the voir dire is ineffective, since the voir dire itself may
taot reveal prejudice and partiality; and that the expense and
delay of an appeal after trial offer little aid to a defendant who
seeks a fair trial from the beginning of the proceedings. After finding
petitioner's remedies at law inadequate and taking notice of a recent
trend extending mandamus to other pretrial motions besides change
of venue,6 the court held that mandamus would lie. In so holding,
the court looked to the American Bar Association's Advisory Com-
mittee Report on Fair Trial and Free Press (Reardon Report)7 which
suggests that mandamus may indeed be necessary in order to assure
a defendant the constitutional right to a speedy and impartial trial.8
'.... Cal. 2d . 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968).
OCash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959) (motion to inspect
documents); Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. !!d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (motion
for psychiatric examinaiton); Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d
593 (1959) (motion for discovery of prosecution's evidence); Gomez v. Superior
Court, 5o Cal. 2d 64o, 328 P.2d 976 (1958) (motion to transfer case to another
court); Harris v. Municipal Court, 209 Cal. 55, 285 P. 699 (1930) (motion to dismiss
action not brought to trial within time required by law); Zamloch v. Municipal
Court, io6 Cal. App. 2d 260, 235 P.2d 25 (Dist Ct. App. 1951) (motion to dismiss
where defendant denied right to a speedy trial).
'ABA ADvIsORY Cormu. REPORT ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, 119-128 (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Reardon Report]. The recommendations of this report were subsequently
approved by the American Bar Association's House of Delegates in 1968.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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Determining that mandamus would lie to review a pretrial order
denying a motion for change of venue was not the only new ground
the court broke. It went on to reject the traditional, limited scope
of review in mandamus cases which was confined only to determining
if the trial court had abused its discretion. The court looked to
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 10 a post-conviction habeas corpus case, where
the Supreme Court of the United States said that when an appellate
court reviews a change of venue motion it should not look merely
to determine if the trial judge abused his discretion, but should
consider the question de novo and make its own determination as
to whether the defendant had a fair trial. The court in Maine con-
sidered the Sheppard rule binding on it even though Sheppard in-
volved post-trial review and not mandamus. Accordingly, it made
an independent evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the
petitioner's application, found that there was a reasonable likelihood
that the petitioner could not receive a fair trial in Mendocino County,
and issued the writ.11
The earliest use of mandamus was in civil cases 12 but the writ has
since been used in criminal cases as well in order to (i) provide a
remedy where there is no other adequate remedy at law,13 and (2) to
compel a lower court to exercise its discretion 4 or to perform some
"Prior to Maine, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Thompson, 266
Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963), reaffirmed a Minnesota pretrial mandamus
procedure similar to that in Maine. However, Thompson has received very little
attention. This is apparently due to its brief opinion, and the well established
practice of the Minnesota courts to allow for only one change of venue in a
criminal proceeding.
10384 U.s. 333 (1966).
uCited as reasons were the following: the defendants were strangers in town
and had committed crimes of a very heinous nature; the local people showed
sympathy for the victims who were prominent members of the community; there
was substantial adverse pretrial publicity; and local politics had become involved
in that the district attorney, the regular trial judge, and counsel for one of the
petitioners were all running for the same political office.
2'See, e.g., Rex v. Askew, 98 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1768), where it is said that
the writ was used as early as the time of Edward 1II. For early United States cases,
see Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 834 (1838); Wood v. Strother, 76
Cal. 545, 18 P. 766 (1888).
nSee, e.g., State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963) (Minnesota
statute provides for only one change of venue, therefore motion may be reviewed
before trial); Flores v. Federici, 7o N.M. 358, 374 P.2d 119 (1962) (justice of peace
has right to jury trial even though the statute did not provide for one); State v.
Hart, 19 Utah 438, 57 P. 415 (1899) (jury impaneling statute did not provide for
appeal, so mandamus provided an adequate remedy).
"See, e.g., Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369
(1911) (trial court did not entertain motion for change of venue; ordered to do
so); State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1963) (trial court did
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ministerial duty.15 As Maine pointed out, this use in criminal cases
has been extended to review pretrial orders where it has been thought
necessary to prevent the "failure of justice"'16 or when other existing
remedies were "not sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury."'
17
For example, mandamus has been held appropriate to direct the
impaneling of a jury,1s the right to a pretrial inspection, 19 the dis-
missal of prosecutions where undue delay was involved,20 a pretrial
hearing,21 a psychiatric examintion,22 and a trial judge's disqualifica-
tion of himself.
23
However, these instances are the exception and not the rule. There
has been a general reluctance to allow the use of mandamus for review
of any pretrial orders in criminal cases because of judicial feeling
that appellate review should be postponed until after final judgment
has been rendered.2 4 There has been a special reluctance to use
mandamus to review pretrial orders denying a change of venue.
not entertain motion for change of venue in misdemeanor action; appellate court
held that venue statute applies to misdemanors, and therefore the motion must
be ruled on).
25See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) (issuing of bench warrant
involved no discretion; mandamus was therefore appropriate); Benners v. State
ex rel. Heflin, 124 Ala. 97, 26 So. 942 (1899) (statute provided that arrest warrant
would issue; trial judge ordered to issue warrant).
"State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 117 Ore. 498, 244 P. 540, 541 (1926).
'7.State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1o55, 1o61 (1963).
"State ex rel. Burton v. Smith, 118 Ohio App. 248, 194 N.E.2d 70 (1962) (trial
court ordered to swear in grand jury; statutory ambiguity called for extraordinary
action by appellate court).
"Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959) (in abortion
prosecution, petitioner was entitled to inspect notes made of oral statements made
by abortion victims).
O°Zamloch v. Municipal Court, io6 Cal. App. 2d 260, 235 P.2d 25 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951) (mandamus issued directing dismissal where postponement of trial
predicated upon nonlegal grounds).
"State ex rel. Corbin v. Murry, 10 Ariz. 184, 427 P.2d 135 (1967) (mandamus
appropriate to direct a pretrial hearing where trial judge asserted that he had no
jurisidiction to hold a pretrial hearing).
"'Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (petitioner had
agreed to take psychiatric examination; trial court abused its discretion by not
allowing it).
Castleberry v. Jones, 68 Okla. Crim. 414, 99 P.2d 174 (1940) (judge had
admitted personal bias against the petitioner).
-'See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2 d
178 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 375 U-.S 907 (1963); State v. Poulos, 196 Kan. 253, 411
P.2d 694, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966); Pankey v. Pound, 428 S.W.2d 777 (Ky.
1968); Pate v. State, 361 P.2d io86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961). The Supreme Court
has stated that "the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal
are especially inimical to the effective and fair administraiton of the criminal
law." DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
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Three reasons can be cited for this reluctance. First, most appellate
courts treat the petition for mandamus review as an interloctutory
appeal and, thus, generally summarily dismiss it25 unless "the damage
of error, unreviewed before the judgment is definitive and complete, is
deemed greater than the disruption caused by immediate appeal .... -26
Such instances are relatively rare.27 Second, it is usually held that,
taken together, the right to exercise peremptory challenges, the right
to renew the motion for change of venue after the voir dire examina-
tion, and the availability of post-trial appeals afford adequte remedies
at law.28 Third, lower court rulings on motions for change of venue
are said to be wholly within the trial judge's discretion.29 While
appellate courts will direct that discretion be exercised,3 0 absent an
"abuse of discretion... clearly untenable, or to an extent clearly
unreasonable"' 31 they are nevertheless hesitant to assume the functions
of the trial court and actually determine how the discretion is to be
exercised.
32
--See, e.g., Auerbach v. United States, 347 F.od 742 (5 th Cir. 1965); Stokes v.
State, go Idaho 339, 411 P.2d 392 (1966); State v. Bihain, 251 Iowa 439, ioi N.W.2d
29 (1960); Pankey v. Pound, 428 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1968).
-nYeloushan v. United States, 313 F.2d 3o3, 305 (5th Cir. 1963).
2-1See, e.g., Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369
(191i) (trial court asserted that it had no jurisdiction to entertain motion; pretrial
mandamus review provided the only adequate remedy at law); State v. Thompson,
266 Minn. 385, 123 N.V.2d 378 (1963) (reaffirmed Minnesota practice of allowing
pretrial mandamus review of motions for change of venue); State ex rel. Ricco
v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953) (trial court did not entertain motion
for change of venue in misdemeanor proceeding; appellate court held that venue
statute applies to misdemeanors, and that the motion must he ruled on).
2sSee Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963); Wilder v. People, 86 Coo. 35, 278 P.
594 (19-9); State v. Poulos, 196 Kan. 253, 411 P.2d 694, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827
(1966); State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 417 (1966); Pate v. State, 361
P.2d io86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961). However, in cases where the renewed motion
is denied and all peremptory challenges are used, if the party on appeal shows
an actual abuse of discretion, or prejudice, the appellate court will afford relief.
See, e.g., People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236 P.2d 145 (1951); Blackwell v. State, 76
Fla. 124, 79 So. 731 (1918); People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 I11L 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 570, 154 S.W.2d 563 (1941).
2Platt v. Minnesota Mining Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964), rev'g 314 F.2d 369
(7 th Cir. 1963); Nowels v. People, . . . Colo...... 44.2 P.2d 410 (1968); State v.
Poulos, ig Kan. 253, 411 P.2d 694, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966); Swain v. State,
219 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d 452 (1966); State v. Truman, 124 Vt. 285, 204 A.-2d 93
(1964).
"'Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369 (191i);
State ex reL. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953).
aState v. Truman, 124 Vt. 285, 204 A.2d 93, 96 (1964).
-See, e.g., Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907
(1963); Stokes v. State, go Idaho 339, 411 P.2d 392 (1966); State v. Bihain, 251 Iowa
439, ioi N.W.2d 29 (1960); Hamilton v. Smart, 78 Kan. 218, 95 P- 836 (1908); Corn-
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The first two reasons (the interlocutory appeal and adequate
remedy at law arguments) for reluctance to use mandamus to review
change of venue orders are relevant to the first part of Maine's hold-
ing that mandamus does in fact lie. The third reason (the limitation
to finding only an abuse of discretion) is relevant to that part of
Maine which extends the scope of review beyond a determination of
whether discretion has been abused to a de novo consideration of
all the facts.
In deciding that writ would lie, Maine did not consider the inter-
locutory appeal argument other than to say that it did not foresee
a flurry of mandamus petitions to review pretrial motions. But the
tenor of the court's opinion and its reliance on the Reardon Report
indicate that this was felt to be a weak argument where a defendant's
constitutional rights are at stake, since such rights should be protected
from the earliest possible moment.
33
The primary basis for Maine's holding is the court's finding that
no other adequate remedy at law existed. The court first said that the
right to exercise peremptory challenges is inadequate because failure
to exhaust all peremptory challenges may, on appeal, be regarded
as an indication that the jury was impartial.3 4 Yet, it recognized that
counsel may not wish to exercise all peremptory challenges due to
the risk that the next juror may be more prejudiced than the juror
in question.35
Maine also concluded that the right to renew the motion for
change of venue after the voir dire is in fact an inadequate remedy.
The finding of inadequacy was based on the uncertainty of whether
monwealth v. Swanson, 424 Pa. 15, 225 A.2d 231 (1967). In stating the traditional
function of an appellate court, Maine reflects the past and current attitude of most
courts: "Ordinarily we are reluctant to depart from the sound principle invariably
pronounced that mandate lies not to control an exrcise of discretion but only to
correct an abuse of discretion." 438 P.2d at 376, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
'"It is neither novel nor inappropriate, therefore, for this court to review
through a mandate proceeding a pretrial order which is likely to substantially
affect a defendant's right to a fair trial." 438 P.2d at 374, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
4See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1967); State v. Poulos, 196 Kan. 243, 411 P.2d 694, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966);
Pate v. State, 361 P.2d io86 (Okla. Grim. App. 1961); Philpot v. State, 169 Tex.
Grim. 91, 332 S.W.2d 323 (ig6o); Reardon Report 127.
3The Supreme Court has indicated that "failure of petitioner's counsel to
exhaust [the peremptory challenges] ... while not dispositive, is significant." United
States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 463 (1956). The Reardon Report has
recognized the attorney's dilemma in exercising peremptory challenges, and has
recommended that "[t]he claim that the venue should have been changed ... shall
not be considered to have been waived ... by the failure to exercise all available
peremptory challenges." Reardon Report § 3.2(e).
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or not the voir dire provides an accurate indication of a juror's
potential partiality in a highly publicized and well-known criminal
proceeding.
While Maine did not consider them, there are other reasons
supporting this conclusion of the inadequacy of the right to renew
the motion after voir dire. Even though there may be uncertainty,
most courts have generally held on appeal that absent "prejudice...
so great that traditional voir dire procedures ... were unavailing to
ensure a fair trial,"36 the voir dire examination and its results are
determinative for a change of venue.37 However, this concept has
received serious criticism. 3s In many criminal proceedings, the nature
and facts of the alleged crime are well-known, and may generate a
prevailing sentiment of hostility in the commuinty in which the trial
is to take place. Due to mass pretrial publicity, and its sometimes
insidious effects, many prospective jurors may not consider them-
selves prejudiced without realizing that news exposure has adversely
affectd their impartiality.39 Moreover, it has been suggested that
even a seemingly successful voir dire may not alone guarantee a fair
trial in strongly prejudiced communities.40
Finally, the court concluded that post-trial appeal may not afford
a defendant sufficient protection. Maine asserted, as had an earlier
court, that "the burden, expense, and delay involved in a trial render
an appeal from an eventual judgment an inadequate remedy." 41
Having established that the peremptory challenge, voir dire, and
post-trial appeal remedies are inadequate, and that mandamus lies
;Pacheco v. State, 82 Nev. 172, 414 P.2d loo, 1o3 (1966).
7See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956); Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Bradley v. State, 245 Ind. 331, 198 N.E.2d 762
(1964); State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 417 (1966).
The following question the effectiveness of the "voir dire remedy": Reardon
Report 126-27; Austin, Prejudice and Change of Venue, 68 DicK L. REV. 401
(1964); "Free Press-Fair Trial" Revisited: Defendant-Centered Remedies as a Pub-
licity Policy, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 512 (1966); Note, Community Hostility and the
Right to an Impartial Jury, 6o CoLum. L. REV. 349 (1960); Note, The Efficacy of
a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42
NoRTE DAME LAWYER 925 (1967).
3See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963); Reardon Report 127.
"0"The requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere impanelng of 12
men against whom no legal complaint can be made. The defendant is entitled to
be tried in a county where a fair proportion of the people qualified for jury
service may be used as a venire from which a jury may be secured to try his case
fairly and impartially, and uninfluenced by a preponderant sentiment that he
should be flung to the lions." Magness v. State, 103 Miss. 30, 6o So. 8, 10 (1912).
"Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878, 880 (1949).
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to review an order denying a change of venue,42 Maine went on to
reject the traditional, limited scope of review in mandamus and
actually decided that venue should be changed. In so doing, it
promulgated a new standard by which mandamus petitions must be
judged. Relying chiefly on Sheppard, it agreed that where a defend-
ant's application has merit "appellate courts must, when their aid
is properly invoked, satisfy themselves de novo on all the exhibits and
affidavits that every defendant obtains a fair and impartial trial."
43
Sheppard was a post-conviction habeas corpus case, and in laying
down its rule there the Supreme Court may have been referring
only to post-trial review. Maine never considered that there might
be a distinction when it applied the Sheppard rule. However, when
Sheppard stated that "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its incep-
tion,"44 it may have specifically intended to include pretrial appellate
review within its rule. Even if the Supreme Court did not so intend,
extending the rule to the pretrial stage as Maine did is entirely
consistent with the purpose behind the Sheppard rule of expanded
appellate court review. Moreover, Maine is not alone in its interpreta-
tion of Sheppard. After long study and after questioning of trial judges
and trial counsel, the Reardon Report also concluded the Sheppard
calls for a pretrial, de novo examination of meritorious petitions for
change of venue.
4 5
By providing that a defendant may, by mandamus petition, test
a pretrial ruling denying change of venue, Maine not only affords an
adequate remedy at law, but also makes more readily available the
constitutional safeguards requiring a fair, speedy, and impartial trial.
It implements the achievement of these results by providing a new
standard by which the mandamus petition is to be judged, a standard
" In holding that mandamus lies, the California Supreme Court looked to the
language of the Reardon Report which reads:
Another important question is the timing of review. If an appeal from a
clearly erroneous denial of a motion for continuance or change of venue is
postponed until after trial, a great deal of time and effort will have been
wasted, and the appellate court may be extremely relucant to reverse. On
the other hand, frivolous appeals are time-consuming in themselves and
may be used solely for purposes of delay. The Committee believes that
the solution lies in allowing discretionary interlocutory appeals or in the
use of an extraordinary writ such as mandamus, with a procedure for
prompt disposition on the papers of cases that lack merit.
Id. at 127-28.
'3438 P.2d at 376, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
44384 U.S. at 363.
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